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Tax cuts have played a prominent  part in the U.S. conservative  political  uprisings  of 
the early 1980s and middle  1990s.  The economic  objective  of these cuts is to “get 
government  off the backs”  of the private economy  to stimulate work,  saving, and 
investment.  Tax cuts on capital gains income are among the most controversial  of these 
proposals.  The Bush administration  recommended  such cuts, and they now are a major part 
of the tax plan that has emerged  from the Republican  “Contract  with America”  in the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  Because  much of the reward from entrepreneurial  activity 
accrues in the form of capital  gains, proponents  of tax cuts argue that lower  capital gains 
rates will be an especially  potent  stimulus to productive  economic  activity.  Critics of these 
tax cuts, however,  point  out that the vast majority  of capital gains income goes to relatively 
wealthy taxpayers.  Therefore,  cutting capital gains taxes would  disproportionately  benefit 
the wealthy at a time when  deficit reduction  plans are squeezing many federal programs  that 
benefit the poor  and middle classes. 
This Brief assesses the economic  benefits that the U.S. economy  can expect if 
capital gains taxes are cut.  We consider  a variety  of channels  through  which capital gains 
taxes might affect economic  decisions  and find that there  is little theoretical  or empirical 
basis for the view that  lower  capital gains tax rates will have a substantial  effect on 
economic growth  or the level of economic  activity.  The reasons  for this conclusion  can be 
divided into two broad  classes.  First, there  are some theoretical  confusions  in much of the 
popular discussion about  the capital gains tax that lead to misleading conclusions  about  its 
economic impact.  Most journalistic  accounts  of the debate  over this topic  assume that 
when the tax on rewards  fi-om entrepreneurial  activity falls more investment  projects  will be 
undertaken.  We show, however,  that as a first approximation,  changes in taxes on profits, 
such as the capital gains tax, will not afhect decisions by firms to undertake  investment 
projects.  Second, while there  are some theoretical  channels through  which capital gains tax rates affect investment  activity,  in particular  if the capital gains tax rate is different  from the 
tax rate on the returns  from other  kinds  of investment,  we  find  the empirical  significance  of 
these effects to be small, possibly negligible.  The estimated decline in the effective  cost  of 
capital from the current  proposal  to lower the highest capital gains tax rate from 28 percent 
to  19.8 is between  one and two percent.  For assumptions that represent  average  values  in 
the U.S. economy,  we estimate  a,decline of only 1.1 percent.  The proposals  to index capital 
gains income for inflation  have a somewhat larger, but still small, effect.  With our average 
assumptions,  the indexation  provision  reduces the effective cost of capital  by 1.6 percent. 
The economic  effect  of such changes is minimal.  Theoretically,  a one-time  change 
in the cost of capital does not  change the long-run growth  rate of the economy,  it affects  the 
level of output  only.  Using assumptions  that are generous  to the capital  gains tax cut and 
the indexation  provision,  we find that its long-term  effect on output  amounts  to about  a 
third of one percent  of U.S.  GDP.  This means that we cannot  expect  the long-term 
economic  impact of this controversial  policy to be greater than that  of roughly  two  months 
of normal  economic  growth,  and it will take years to realize even this small benefit. 
These results lead us to the conclusion  that claims about a large stimulus to 
investment  from lower  capital  gains taxes are often overstated.  The vast majority  of future 
investment  activities  that would  benefit from a lower capital gains tax rate would  likely  have 
been undertaken  at the current  capital gains rate, which is already effectively  much lower 
than the highest marginal tax rate on ordinary  income.  We therefore  dispute  the claim that  a 
lower  capital gains tax rate will have large beneficial effects on output,  growth,  or 
entrepreneurial  activity  in the U.S. economy.  The debate over the appropriate  capital  gains 
tax rate should focus on other  considerations.  These include the distribution  of tax burdens 
across different  individuals  and different time periods. 
It is clear that  most capital  gains income accrues to relatively  wealthy  taxpayers  and 
that  cutting  the capital gains tax rate would  most benefit these individuals.  Feenberg  and 
Summers (1990),  for example,  show that over half of capital gains income  goes to 
2 individuals  in the  top  one  percent  of the  income  distribution.1  Equity  considerations  might 
therefore  suggest  that  lower  capital  gains  rates  are  undesirable.  Indeed,  since  aspects  of the 
current  tax  law  already  create  preferences  for  capital  gains  income,  one  might  argue  that 
capital  gains  rates  should  be increased  to  achieve  a more  progressive  tax  system.  The  fact 
that  nominal  (rather  than  “real”)  capital  gains  are taxed,  however,  implies  that  effective 
capital  gains  tax  rates  vary  arbitrarily  across  time  with  inflation  rates.  Some  proposals 
attempt  to  eliminate  this  problem  by indexing  capital  gains  taxes  to  inflation.  Another 
contentious  issue  in the  debate  over  capital  tax  cuts  is whether  they  will  increases  or 
decrease  tax  revenue.  Some  analysts  argue  that  “realizations”  of capital  gains  may  increase 
so much  following  a tax  cut  that  the  government  may  collect  more  revenue  at lower  capital 
gains  tax  rates.  Such  findings  are  controversial,  however,  and  other  studies  conclude  that 
lower  capital  gains  tax  rates  will reduce  revenues  and  increase  the  deficit.2  Considerations 
of this  kind  likely  dominate  the  small,  even  negligible  impact  we  find  of lower  capital  gains 
taxes  on  investment  and  growth.  We  believe  it is important  that  the  debate  over  this 
controversial  tax  policy  focus  on  the  right  issues. 
II.  What  is the Effective  Capital  Gains  Tax Rate? 
There  have  been  many  modifications  in the  tax  treatment  of capital  gains  since  the 
inception  of the  federal  income  tax  in  1913 .3  Through  192 1, capital  gains  income  was 
treated  no  differently  than  income  from  any  other  source.  For  the  first  time  in  1922,  capital 
1  It is often argued  that such statistics  are misleading  because  a sizable  fraction  of capital  gains  go to people  of modest 
means  who sell  a home or business  and therefore  have artificially  inflated  incomes  in the year they receive  capital 
gains.  Feenberg  and  Summers  (1990),  however,  examine  this problem  and  find  that it does not significantly  change  the 
conclusions. 
2 See Auten  and  Cordes (1991)  and Minarik  (1992)  for discussion  of this  issue  and  further references. 
3 For a legislative  history  of the tax treatment  of capital  gains,  see Joint  Committee  on Taxation  (1995)  and  Office  of 
the Secretary  of the Treasury,  Oflice  of Tax Analysis  (1985). 
3 gains were defined apart from ordinary  income,  and policy makers have tinkered  with 
capital gains tax treatment  ever since.  There are many ways in which capital gains taxation 
has been modified.  Various  policy reforms  have altered the deductibility  of capital losses, 
the holding time necessary  to constitute  a long-term  capital gain,  the fraction  of long-term 
capital gains income that may be excluded from taxable income, and the statutory  tax rate 
on capital gains income. 
One way to track  the tax treatment  of capital gains income from year to year is to 
consider the maximum marginal tax rate on long-term  capital gains income under successive 
tax regimes.  Although  this rate varies with the situation  of the taxpayer,  the general trend 
from  1922 through  1978 has been up.  Under fairly typical  conditions,  the maximum 
marginal rate rose from  12.5 percent  in 1922 to 49.1 percent  in 1978.  With passage of the 
Revenue Act of 1978, the maximum marginal tax rate on capital gains income dropped  to 
28 percent.  This figure is arrived at by combining  a maximum personal tax rate on ordinary 
income of 70 percent  with the exclusion rate of 60 percent  for capital gains income.  Thus,  a 
one dollar increase  of capital  gains income  for someone  in the top tax bracket  created  a 40 
cent increase in taxable income  which was taxed  at rate of 70 percent; leading to 28 cents  of 
additional  tax.4  The Economic  Recovery  Tax Act of  198 1 lowered the highest personal  tax 
rate to 50 percent  and thus lowered  the maximum marginal tax rate on capital gains income 
to 20 percent.  With passage  of the Tax Reform  Act of 1986, the highest rate on personal 
income was lowered  to 28 percent,  but the capital gains exclusion was eliminated,  raising 
4 Calculation  of previous  maximum  marginal  rates  on capital  gains  income  is not this simple,  partially  because  capital 
gains  income  was not subject  to the same  statutory  rate schedule  as ordinary  income  between  1922 and  1978.  Also, 
beginning  in  1970, the excluded  portion  of capital  gains  income  was considered  an item of “tax preference”  and  subject 
to another  ‘minimum  tax.”  At the same time,  a distinction  was made  between  “earned  income”  and  other income. 
Earned  income  was subject  to a lower,  so called  “maximum  tax,” than  other income.  Each dollar  of excluded  capital 
gains  income  shifted  some of the taxpayer’s total income  out of favorably  treated  earned  income  and  into the higher 
taxed other income.  The separate  rate  schedule  had the effect of lowering  the maximum  marginal  rate on capital  gains 
income.  The  “minimum  tax” and  “maxim um tax” provisions  had the effect of raising  the maximum  marginal  tax rate 
on capital  gains  income.  Together,  these  provisions  make  the calculation  of the maximum  marginal  tax rate on capital 
gains  income  in this period  complicated.  The  1978 Act eliminated  these provisions  and  simplified  the calculation  of 
effective  capital  gains  tax rates. 
4 the maximum marginal tax rate on capital gains to 28 percent.  One of the  provisions  of  this 
act was  that  if marginal personal tax rates were to increase in the future, the maximum 
marginal tax rate on capital gains was to remain at 28 percent; it would take  a separate  act 
to increase this rate.  Since the passage of the  1986 Act, the highest personal  marginal  tax 
rate has in fact increased to 39.6 percent,  but the maximum marginal tax rate on capital 
gains has not been raised. 
Although  the current maximum marginal tax rate on capital gains is 28 percent,  this 
rate does not accurately  represent  the year-to-year  tax burden associated  with capital gains 
taxation  in many cases; the actual burden is usually lower.  Unlike personal  income  derived 
from wages,  dividends,  and interest,  capital gains may accrue over time but are not actually 
taxed until the gain is realized.  To illustrate  the advantage  from tax deferral,  consider  the 
following  example.  Suppose an asset grows  in value at a rate of 20 percent  per year for  12 
years.  It is fairly straight  forward  to show that,  after  12 years, the owner  of this asset will 
have the same after-tax  wealth whether  the capital gain is taxed once at a rate of 28 percent 
at the end of the period  or twelve times at a rate of 14 percent every year.5  Thus, when we 
compare the tax rate on capital gains with the tax rates on other types of income  that  are 
actually taxed  every year, we need to consider  the tax deferral advantage  associated  with 
capital gains income. 
It is also the case that many realizations  of capital gains are not subject to taxation  at 
all.  In particular,  when an asset is held until death, the new owner of the asset is not 
responsible  for capital gains taxes on its past appreciation.  If the asset is immediately  sold, 
then, this income will not be subject to capital gains taxation  at all.  Even  if the asset is not 
immediately  sold, the base value for purposes  of computing future taxes is adjusted  to the 
value at the time of inheritance. 
5 For a more detailed  treatment,  see Auerbach  1983, p. 9 19n. 
5 For  these  reasons,  the  “effective,”  year-to-year  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  (sometimes 
called  the  “accrual-equivalent“  tax  rate)  is actually  lower  than  the  statutory  rate.  The  size 
of this  difference  varies  across  taxpayers.  For  a particular  class  of taxpayers  the  effective 
capital  gains  tax  rate  declines  with  the  holding  period  of  capital  asset,  the  growth  rate  in the 
value  of the  asset,  and  the  proportion  of assets  acquired  through  inheritance.  To  account 
for  the  deferral  advantage  of capital  gains  income,  many  studies  halve  the  statutory  rate.  To 
account  for  the  inheritance  advantage  of  capital  gains  income,  the  rate  is often  halved 
again.6  In  the  current  tax  environment,  this  approach  would  lead  to  an effective  capital 
gains  tax  rate  of only  7 percent!  Also,  the  size  of the  adjustments  made  for  deferral  and 
inheritance  effects  are  important  for  evaluating  the  impact  of capital  gains  tax  reform  on 
investment  and  growth.  Cutting  the  capital  gains  rate  by  50 percent  has  a much  bigger 
impact  if the  initial  rate  is 28 percent  than  it will  if the  initial  effective  rate  is 7 percent.  We 
have  considered  several  possibilities  for  the  effective  initial  rate  to  see  how  policy 
conclusions  depend  on  this  issue. 
III.  Economic  Theory  and the  Capital  Gains  Tax 
There  is wide  agreement  in the  popular  press  discussions  that  capital  gains  taxes 
discourage  entrepreneurial  activity  and  that  a capital  gains  tax  cut  would  therefore  be  a 
stimulus  to  investment  and  technology.  For  example,  Steve  Forbes  attributes  the  high- 
technology  “boom  of  the  1980s”  to  capital  gains  tax  cuts  in the  late  1970s  (Forbes,  January 
18,  1993,  p. 26).  USA Toady (November  18,  1994)  reports  that  “the  1986  increase  in the 
[capital  gains]  tax  proved  a disaster  for  capital-hungry  businesses.”  Senator  Connie  Mack 
writes  “[i]n  effect  we  threw  away  the  key  to  investment  and  economic  growth  in  1987  when 
6 See King  and Fullerton  1984, Feldstein  and  Summers  1979, Fullerton  et. al.  1981, and Feldstein,  Poterba,  and  Dicks- 
Miremx  1983. 
6 the  capital  gains  tax  rate  was  increased”  (Wall Street Journal,  August  29,  1995,  p.  A14). 
Views  such  as these  seem  based  on  the  rather  straightforward  and  intuitive  notion  that  by 
lowering  the  tax  bite  on  gains  accruing  to  firms  that  make  profitable  investments,  the 
incentive  to  undertake  investment  will  be  enhanced.  From  this  view  flow  claims  of  higher 
growth,  faster  technological  progress,  and  an overall  more  robust  economy  following  a 
capital  gains  tax  cut. 
But  things  are  not  always  what  they  seem  on the  surface,  and  this  intuitive  view 
deserves  closer  scrutiny.  A deeper  analysis  reveals  a somewhat  surprising  result:  As a first 
approximation,  a cut  in capital  gains  tax  rates,  or  any tax  on  the  profits  from  investment 
activities,  may  have  IU) efict  on  investment  incentives  for  firms.  We  call this  result  “tax 
rate  independence.”  We  lay out  the  logic  and  assumptions  behind  this  result  which  will 
serve  as a kind  of benchmark  for  analysis.  Then,  we  will  consider  how  the  way  that  the 
actual  U.S.  tax  system  operates  might  modify  the  benchmark  conclusion. 
A.  The Benchmark  Case:  Tax Rate  Independence 
To  understand  why  capital  gains  tax  rates  might  not  affect  a firm’s  investment 
decisions  at all, consider  a hypothetical  firm  with  managers  that  maximize  the  value  of the 
firm  for  its owners.  Suppose  that  the  firm  managers  are  contemplating  an investment 
project  that  they  know  will increase  firm  value  by $1 million.  If the  capital  gains  from  this 
activity  accrue  to  firm  shareholders  free  of tax,  their  wealth  rises  by $1 million.  If,  however, 
capital  gains  are taxed  at 28  percent,  shareholder  wealth  rises  by  only  $720,000. 
Clearly  the  shareholders  would  prefer  to  be free  of capital  gains  taxes.  But  how 
would  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  tax  affect  the  decision  of the  firms’ managers  to 
undertake  the  investment  project?  The  answer  is:  not  at all in this  simple  environment. 
The  project  still increases  shareholder  wealth  if the  gains  are  taxed,  and  the  firm  would 
7 sacrifice value for its shareholders  if it did  not  invest  in the project.  That is, while 
$l,OOO,OOO  is better than  $720,000,  $720,000  is better  than  nothing! 
We shall refer to this result as tax rate independence.  It shows that firms that 
maximize shareholder  value will always undertake  projects that increase  shareholder  value, 
as long as the capital gains tax rate is less than  100 percent.  This result, however,  relies on 
a strong  and, in practice,  unrealistic  assumption.  Our example assumes that the market 
value of the project  is unaffected  by the imposition  of capital gains taxes.  There  are many 
practical  reasons why this assumption  may fail and the capital gains tax rate could  matter  for 
actual  investment  decisions.  For example, capital gains taxes are levied on nominal  rather 
than real gains.  In addition,  the returns from  some investments are taxed at capital gains 
rates (such as gains on the sale of corporate  equity) while others are taxed  at different  rates 
(such as interest  and dividend income).  If capital gains tax rates are cut while the tax rates 
on other  assets are unchanged,  some projects  that generate  capital gains may be undertaken 
that would  have been dominated  by an investment  in interest-bearing  assets at a higher 
capital gains rate.  In the following  discussion,  we shall consider these and other  issues in 
detail that  may cause tax rate independence  to fail.  Yet, tax rate independence  is a useful 
benchmark,  and it is an effective  counter-argument  to the simple view that  cutting  capital 
gains tax rates will obviously  stimulate investment  because it reduces the tax bite on the 
gains firm owners  experience  from successful  investment  projects.  Asset owners  will like 
lower  tax rates on their capital gains, but it is not so obvious that these lower  tax rates 
should  change firm decisions  about whether  to undertake  investment  projects.  To obtain  an 
effwt  of capital gains taxes on investment  decisions,  we must move beyond  simple intuition. 
8 B.  Uncertainty  and Risk  Aversion 
The tax rate independence  discussion ignores two aspects  of investment  decisions 
that many analysts consider  crucial to the debate over cutting  capital gains taxes:  risk and 
uncertainty.  Uncertainty  alone will not change tax rate independence,  but the desire of 
entrepreneurs  to avoid risk, that is, their risk aversion,  may make a difference.  We now 
consider these issues in some detail. 
Continuing  with the kind of example presented  earlier,  suppose  now that the firm 
has a potential  investment  project with an uncertain  rather than a sure return.  The firm 
managers believe the project  will increase firm value by $2,000,000  with 50 percent 
probability,  but there is also a 50 percent  chance that the project  fails and firm value falls by 
the start-up  cost of the project,  which we assume to be $100,000.  If the firm owners do not 
care about project’s risk, standard  economic  theory  predicts  that the firm will undertake  the 
project  if the weighted  average  of possible project  returns  is positive.  The weights in this 
average are the probabilities  associated  with each return. 7 In our example, this calculation 
would be: 
(0.5) x $2,000,000  + (0.5) x -$100,000  = $950,000. 
This calculation  is called the “expected  value” of the project.  In this example, a firm with 
owners that do not care about the risk of this project  (risk-neutral  owners)  would undertake 
the project  to raise the firm’s expected  value.  If the government  imposes  a tax on the 
capital gain when the project  is success&l  and allows the firm owners  to write off its capital 
loss against other income  if the project  fails, the projects’ expected  value will fall, but the 
expected value will  still remain  positive  for  any capital  gains tax rate less than 100 
percent.  The firm should  still undertake  the project  to increase the expected  wealth  of its 
7  The theory  used here assumes  that fm  owners  wish  to maxim&  their  expected  utility  when  they face uncertainty. 
This approach  is the dominant  fom  of analysis  in economic  theory to understand  the behavior  of agents  that make 
decisions  in an environment  of uncertainty. 
9 owners and tax rate independence  holds.8  In this situation,  a cut in the capital gains tax rate 
would not affect firms’ choices  to undertake  investment projects. 
It may seem restrictive  to assume that the firm’s owners do not care about the risk of 
the firm’s project,  but there  are good  reasons to believe that a large portion  of U.S. capital 
investment  is undertaken  in just  this kind of environment.  Although  most empirical research 
on individual attitudes  toward  risk finds that individuals are risk averse, owners  will want 
their managers to make investment  decisions without  concern  about risk if the owners  can 
diversify their investments. 9  An investor  cares about the risk of her total  portfolio,  which is 
negligibly affected by the risk of any single firm when her investments  are diversified.  The 
best thing a firm’s managers  can do for its diversified owners is to maximize the firm’s 
expected value.  As we have seen above, this kind of behavior  leads to tax rate 
independence  where  a change  in the capital gains tax rate will not affect a firm’s decision  to 
undertake  investment  projects. 
How much investment  in the economy  is carried out by firms in this situation? 
There is no way to get a precise  measure.  But it is suggestive to note that the publicly 
traded  companies tracked  by the Compustat  data service accounted  for roughly  half of 
aggregate  U.S. plant and equipment  spending.  It is sensible to assume that most owners  of 
public firms, especially large public firms, are well diversified.  Moreover,  a substantial 
portion  of private  firms are owned  by institutional  investors  such as pension  funds, mutual 
funds, life insurance  companies,  or even venture  capital funds which also provide 
diversification, 
* In practice,  there  are restrictions  on the way in which capital  losses  that can be deducted  against  non-capital  gains 
income.  We shall  return  to this  issue  later  in this Brief. 
’ Managers,  however,  may not follow  owners’  wishes.  Xit  is costly for managers  to fmd new jobs  in the case of a 
business  failure,  for example,  managers’  personal  risk  aversion  may be reflected  in the investment  decisions  of the firm 
even if such behavior  is not in the best  interest  of shareholders.  This  kind  of phenomenon  is called  an “agency 
problem”  in the economics  research  literature. 
10 There  are undoubtedly  important  cases,  however,  in which  owners’  personal  attitude 
toward  risk  may  play  a role  in the  decision  to  undertake  an investment  project  with 
uncertain  outcomes.  Substantial  evidence  has  been  compiled  showing  that  firms’ investment 
may  be  restricted  by the  availability  of credit  or the  ability  to  sell new  equity  on  the  open 
market.lO  In  such  an environment,  the  firm  will  rely  more  heavily  on  internal  tinds  to 
finance  investment,  that  is, on  fi.mds generated  from  firm  profits  or  money  put  up  from  the 
personal  wealth  of  firm  “insiders”  who  have  detailed  knowledge  about  the  firm’s operations 
and  opportunities.  The  insider  group  may  be  small,  possibly  consisting  ofjust  a single 
entrepreneur  or  maybe  a small  venture  capital  group.  A substantial  portion  of insiders’ 
wealth  may  be tied  up  in the  firm  and,  if so,  their  portfolios  will  not  be diversified.ll 
Investment  undertaken  with  this  kind  of  structure  is likely  to  be important  for 
economic  growth.  Venture  capital,  for  example,  is concentrated  in high-technology 
activities.12  Much  of the  rhetoric  in support  of  cutting  capital  gains  tax  rates  argues  that 
this  is the  kind  of  activity  that  lower  capital  gains  taxes  will  encourage.  We  will  now 
evaluate  this  claim. 
The  tax  rate  independence  result  will generally  not  hold  for  investment  projects 
undertaken  by firms  with  undiversified  ownership  by risk-averse  individuals.  It  is possible 
that  capital  gains  tax  cuts  would  cause  a firm  in this  situation  to  invest  in a project  that  it 
would  have  rejected  when  its owners  faced  a higher  tax  rate.  But  it is usually  not 
recognized  that  the  opposite  result  can  also  occur:  lower  capital  gains  tax  rates  might 
lo The restrictions  firms  face on external  fimds may take the form of an increase-d cost for credit  or they may result 
from  rationing,  where  fums  cannot  obtain  external  fmance  no matter  what price they pay.  The extensive  empirical 
literature  linking  external  finance  restrictions  to investment  is surveyed  by Hubbard  (1995). 
’ I See Fazzari  and  Variate  (1994)  for lkther  discussion  of how restrictions  on firms’ access to external  finance  lead  to 
undiversified  positions  taken  by fum  insiders. 
l2  See Al-Suwailem  (1995)  for discussion  of venture  capital.  One  should  not exaggerate  the importance  of venture 
capital  for aggregate  investment  Al-Suwailem  shows that total U.S.  venture  capital  disbursements  never  exceeded  $4 
billion  dollars  fkom 1984 to 1993.  During  this period,  nonresidential  fixed investment  averaged  over $500 billion. 
11 discourage  investment  for a firm with undiversified  owners.  We shall now explain  the 
intuition  that lies behind these results. 
Consider  a project  with uncertain  returns, like the example discussed above. 
Because the project  has a positive expected  value a risk-neutral  investor  will undertake  it, 
regardless  of what the capital gains tax rate is.  A risk-averse  investor  will put less value on 
the project  because the uncertainty  associated  with its returns  will offset, to some extent, 
the benefits  of the average gain.  How will a change in the capital gains tax rate affect the 
investment  decision  of such an individual?  A lower capital gains tax rate increases the 
reward he obtains if the project  is successful.  But to the extent that  capital losses are 
deductible  against other  capital gains income,  a lower capital gains rate also reduces the 
value of his tax deduction  if the project  fails.  It appears that  a lower capital gains  tax rate 
could make the project  more  or less valuable to a risk averse  investor. 
A deeper look  at the economic  theory  underlying  this situation  shows that  if an 
investor  is just  slightly risk averse, a lower  capital gains tax rate will increase the value  she 
places on an uncertain  project.  As risk aversion  rises beyond  some critical level, however, 
lower capital gains rates will decrease  an investor’s valuation  of the project  because the 
benefit of lower taxes obtained  when the project  is successful is not sufficient to offset the 
loss incurred  from the lower tax deduction  when the project  fails. l3 
A numerical  example helps to illustrate  this point  and also shows that this apparently 
perverse result can arise in unremarkable  circumstances.  Consider  an entrepreneur  with 
$500,000 in initial wealth  who is contemplating  an investment  project  that  costs $100,000. 
The project  is quite risky:  it succeeds  with only 20 percent  probability.  But the payoff  of 
the project  is high, it generates  a gain of $l,OOO,OOO  (in present  value) if it is successful.  If 
I3 This result  occurs because  risk aversion  implies  that as individuals  get more  wealthy,  they value  increments  to 
wealth  less.  Therefore,  for an individual  who is sufliciently  risk averse,  the incremental  valuation  of the returns  from a 
project  when  the project  is successti.11  and the investor  is wealthy  means  less to the investor  than  the incremental  loss 
due to a lower tax deduction  when  the project  fails  and the investor’s wealth  is lower. 
12 it is unsuccessful,  the  project  has zero  residual  value.  This  project  has  a positive  pre-tax  net 
expected  value  of  $120,000.  14 If the  capital  gains  tax  rate  is 28 percent,  the  entrepreneur’s 
after-tax  expected  wealth  would  rise  by $86,400  if the  project  is undertaken,  so  the 
investment  would  be  made  if the  entrepreneur  is risk  neutral.  Let  us now  assume,  however, 
that  the  entrepreneur  is sufficiently  risk  averse  that  she will not  undertake  the  project  at the 
tax  rate  of 28 percent.  What  happens  if the  tax  rate  falls to  19.8 percent?  The 
entrepreneur’s  after-tax  wealth  is higher  if the  project  is successful  because  she  will  pay  less 
tax  on  her  $l,OOO,OOO  gain,  but  she  loses  more  in the  bad  state  of the  world  because  the  tax 
benefit  Corn  her  $100,000  loss  is lower.  With  a reasonable  specification  of the 
entrepreneur’s  risk  aversion,  the  lower  tax  rate  actually  reduces  the  expected  utility  derived 
from  the  project.15 
The  theory  can  help  us understand  the  situations  in which  the  perverse  result  is more 
likely.  That  is, we  can  say something  about  the  kind  of investment  projects  for  which  lower 
capital  gains  tax  rates  might  actually  discourage  investment  in risky  projects.  First,  as the 
discussion  above  implies,  perverse  results  are  more  likely  if the  investors  are  more  risk 
averse.  As  discussed  above,  greater  risk  aversion  is most  likely  when  a project  is 
undertaken  by undiversified  investors  who  put  a substantial  portion  of  their  personal  wealth 
at risk  to  undertake  the  project.  This  situation  is most  likely  to  arise  in firms  without  good 
access  to  public  securities  markets  due  to  severe  information  problems,  an environment 
often  associated  with  investments  in new,  high-technology  industries.  Second,  the 
“perverse”  result  is more  likely  for  a project  with  a lower  probability  of success,  but  with  a 
higher  payoff  when  it is successful.  This  situation  also  characterizes  much  of  high- 
technology  or venture  capital  investment.  It  appears  that  a lower  capital  gains  tax  is more 
l4 The project  generates  $1,000,000  in profit  if it is successful  and a loss of $100,000  if it fails.  Since  the probability 
of success  is 0.20, the expected  value  of the project  equals  (0.20 x Sl,OOO,OOO)  - (0.80 x $100,000)  = $120,000. 
l5  Specifically,  we assume  that the entrepreneur’s  utility  function  displays  constant  relative  risk aversion  with  a 
coeffh5ent  of 2.0.  This  specification  has some support  in the literature  on decision-making  under  uncertainty.  See, for 
example,  Friend  and Blume  (1975) and Zeldes  (1989). 
13 likely to have a perverse  impact on investment  for those kinds of projects  that proponents  of 
capital gains tax cuts often target  for assistance. 
One might criticize the assumption  made in the analysis above that capital  losses  are 
fully deductible  against  other  capital gains income.  If the potential  investment  project  is 
part of a firm’s on-going  operations,  the costs of unsuccessful ventures  can be written  off 
against profits  from other  parts of the business.  (Consider  the costs of unsuccessful  R&D 
projects,  for example.)  In mutual funds, losses incurred on some securities  will reduce  the 
taxable gains from other  successful activities  undertaken  by the firms in the fund.  Also, 
even if the restriction  on deducting  capital losses does bind in a given year,  losses can be 
carried forward  to offset future  capital gains. 
The points  raised in this subsection  imply that the impact of tax policy  on risk taking 
is a complex  phenomenon.  In some cases, lower capital gains tax rates might  boost 
investment  through  these channels.  But the aggregate  effects seem limited,  in that  much 
investment  is undertaken  in environments  for which this effect is not relevant.  Furthermore, 
even when uncertainty  and risk aversion  matter for investment  decisions,  it is not clear that 
cutting the capital  gains tax rate will encourage  more investment.  We conclude  that  there  is 
no strong  theoretical  or empirical evidence  that  supports  the view that a lower  capital  gains 
tax rate encourages  risk taking  to a significant  degree. 
C.  The  Tack-in”  Effect 
Research  on capital gains taxes has identified  another  channel through  which the 
capital gains tax rate may Sect  the level and allocation  of investment.  The “lock-in”  effect 
occurs when  holders  of old assets with relatively  low returns  have an incentive  to hold  onto 
them for tax reasons  rather than  sell them to invest instead in new assets with higher 
returns.  The implication  of the lock-in  effect is that ventures  that  are more  productive  than 
existing activities  remain unexploited  because the tax code discourages  investors  from 
14 putting  their money into activities with the highest social returns.  Some have argued that  a 
reduction  in the capital gains rate would mitigate the lock-in effect and enhance  the 
productivity  of the United  States capital stock.  For example, Senator  Connie  Mack writes 
that “[b]y reducing the capital gains tax rate .  .  . $1.5 trillion in locked-up  gains can be 
released to pursue investment  opportunities  that create jobs  and growth  in the U.S. 
economy”  (Wall Street Journal,  August 29,  1995, p. A14). 
To understand  how the capital gains tax may create a lock-in  friction  in the flow of 
financial capital to its most productive  uses, we need to identity  the incentives  faced by a 
portfolio  holder who is considering  reallocating  her wealth across assets.  An investor  will 
reallocate  capital across assets as long as the benefits of doing so exceed the costs.  An 
obvious benefit of reallocation  is the potentially  higher rate of return  achieved  by selling low 
return  assets and using the proceeds  to purchase high return assets.  Recall,  however,  that 
because the capital gains tax is levied upon the realization of capital gains rather  than the 
accrual, there is also a tax benefit  (which increases as an asset’s holding  period  increases)  to 
holding  any asset.  It may be that the tax benefit of holding on to a low-return  asset may 
exceed the gain from switching  to an asset with higher returns.  The lower  is the capital 
gains tax rate, the lower  are the benefits from accrual and the lower  is the cost of portfolio 
reallocation. 
To illustrate the lock-in  effect,  consider an investor who 9 years  ago purchased  an 
asset for $1,000 that has grown  in value at an annual rate of 10 percent  and is today  worth 
!§2,357.95.  Suppose further  that this investor  has one more year in his planning  horizon  and 
has the opportunity  to purchase,  for the final year, and asset that returns  11.5 percent.  The 
investor  can sell his position  in the old asset and use the proceeds  to invest  in the higher 
return  asset, but with a capital gains tax rate of 28 percent the investor  is actually  better  off 
holding  the old asset for one more year; he is locked-in to a lower  return  asset.  If he were 
to sell the low-return  asset now,  and pay capital gains taxes, he would  have  $1,977.72 
($1,000 + 0.72 x ($2,357.95  - $1,000))  remaining to invest in the higher  return  asset.  After 
15 one year of earning  11.5 percent,  and paying  capital  gains  tax,  his  wealth would  be 
$2141.48  ($1,977.72  + 0.72. x 0.115 x $1,977.72).  Alternatively,  ifhe  simply holds the 
asset paying a 10 percent  return  and defers capital gains taxes for an additional  year,  he will 
have $2,147.49  ($1,000 + 0.72 x ($2,593.74  - $1,000)).  That is, the investor  makes  $6.01 
by avoiding  the sale of a low return asset to buy a high return  asset because of the deferral 
benefit  of the capital gains tax.  When the capital gains tax rate is 19.8%, this is no longer 
the case and the investor  is better of selling the old asset to buy the new. 
This illustration  is illuminating,  but also a bit misleading.  Recall that the malady of 
the lock-in  effect is the inefficient allocation  of capital resources  it is said to create  in the 
aggregate.  But not all investors  are subject to the capital gains tax.  In particular,  large 
institutional  investors  like pension finds  are not subject to the capital gains tax.  From  1980 
to  1993, the contribution  from insurance  and pension  reserves to total  annual increases  in 
financial  assets averaged 47%. 16 Minarik  (1992, p. 20) writes that “owners  of about  half of 
all corporate  equity are entities that  are unaffected  by the capital gains tax because  they are 
either non-taxable  U.S. institutions  or foreigners  not  subject to U.S. taxation  on capital 
gains.”  Thus, although  some investors  are locked-in,  a significant  proportion  of financial 
investment  is undertaken  by investors  who  are not.  With the existence  of these large 
uninhibited  organizations,  it is difficult to argue that there are significant  unexploited  profit 
opportunities  in capital markets that  could be eliminated with a reduction  in the capital gains 
tax rate.  Put another  way, although  reducing  the capital gains tax rate would  mitigate  the 
lock-in  effect, it would not necessari!y  increase  the productivity  of the capital stock.17 
In addition,  even if the capital gains tax creates  a lock-in  effect to which all 
investors  were subject, the solution  is not necessarily  to lower the capital gains tax rate. 
The lock-in  effect exists because  capital gains are taxed upon realization  rather  than  accrual. 
l6 Economic  Report  of the President,  1995, Table B-30. 
l7 Some analysts  argue that the lock-in effect actually  enhances  effkiency  because  it reduces  the incentive  for 
excessive  trading  of  financial assets  for short-term  gain  and causes  investors  to focus on long-term  productivity. 
16 A more comprehensive  solution  would be to convert the capital gains tax to  an accrual- 
based tax.  This possibility  has been explored in the economics literature.  There  are, 
however,  problems with such a tax.  For some assets, in particular  assets traded  on well- 
organized markets,  an accrual based capital gains tax is feasible because the value of these 
assets are set and accessible every day, so it is straightforward  to determine their value. 
Moreover,  a portion  of assets traded in well-organized  markets could be sold to cover  the 
tax liability on the accrued income they generate.  (Sales of shares of stock,  for example, 
could be used to pay the tax on their accrued increase in value.)  For other  assets which  are 
traded  on thin markets  if they are traded  at all--e.g., Van Gogh paintings--valuation  is 
difficult and there is no way to sell portions  of these assets to pay for a tax liability on the 
accrual of their value.18 
D.  Capital Gains Rates, Savers, and Investors 
Up to this point,  the analysis has assumed that owners of firms and potential 
investors  evaluate the net present value of investment  projects  at a fixed interest  rate,  set 
independently  of capital gains taxation.  This assumption,  however,  may not be correct.  A 
change in the capital gains tax rate changes the return savers can obtain on their investments 
in certain kinds of firms.  Lower  capital gains taxes may reduce the return savers require  to 
provide investment  finance to firms and may also change the allocation  of tinds  to different 
sectors of the economy.  In this subsection,  we shall evaluate  the logic and quantitative 
significance of this phenomenon. 
Suppose that  a potential  investor  requires a fixed after-tax  rate of return  say 10 
percent, to make it worthwhile  to put money  into a group  of firms.  If one firm in the group 
l*  The accrual  tax is discussed  by Auerbach  (1992)  who offers suggestions  about  ways to overcome  the practical 
problems  mentioned  in the text. 
I7 pays out all its income as dividends  (and hence does not generate  capital  gains) and the 
maximum personal tax rate on dividends, as in current law, is 39.6 percent,  then the firm 
will have to earn a pre-tax rate of return r that  satisfies the equation: 
10 = (1 - .396) r, which implies r = 16.56. 
That is, the firm will only be able to attract  capital from this investor  if it can provide  a pre- 
tax return  of 16.56 percent.  If this investor  is representative  of the financial  community,  the 
firm will only undertake  an investment  project  if its managers believe the project  will attain 
a return  at least this high. 
Now  suppose that a similar firm retains  its income rather than  paying  it out as 
dividends.  The owners of this firm will realize income by selling shares  of this firm, which 
will have appreciated  due to the value built up in the company  by its historical  retained 
earnings.  These owners will receive  capital  gains income.  Assume again that the 
representative  investor in this firm also requires  an after-tax  return  of  10 percent,  but that 
the effective  capital gains tax rate is only 28 percent (as in current  law), less than the income 
tax rate that applies to dividends.  The investor  would then need to have pre-tax  return  of 
10 = (1 - .28) r, which implies r = 13.89. 
This firm would only need to realize a return  of 13.89 percent  to attract  funds and make an 
investment  project worthwhile.  If the two firms were identical  in all respects,  except that 
one paid dividends and one retained  earnings,  one would expect  that  the high retention  firm 
would undertake  more projects. 19 A fall in the capital gains rate to  19.8 percent,  as is now 
being considered,  would lower the pre-tax  rate of return the firm must pay to investors  even 
further.  The rate would  solve the equation 
10 = (1 - .198) r, which  implies r = 12.47. 
1  g This  analysis  begs the question  of why firms  pay dividends  at all given  their  tax consequences.  One  reason  is likely 
to be that dividends  provide  signals  of mauagementk  assessment  of long-term  earning  potential.  These  signals  may be 
valuable  enough  to investors  to offset the tax disadvantages. 
18 A capital gains tax rate cut, by favoring  capital gains income to an even greater  extent  than 
current law, will lower the rate of return  firms will have to give their investors  and therefore 
encourage  them to undertake  more projects. 
These effects seem rather large, but they ignore  many complexities of the cost  of 
capital.  For example, the cost of using capital includes depreciation  as well as the return 
that must be provided  to owners.  We must also recognize  that firms finance some 
investment with debt rather than equity or retained  earnings  and that some of the return  to 
equity is paid in the form of dividends rather  than capital gains.  These and other  factors  are 
incorporated  in the formula for the cost of capital derived in the technical appendix to this 
Brief  When we evaluate  the proposed  drop in the maximum statutory  capital gains tax rate 
fi-om 28 to  19.8 percent  with this formula,  the effective  cost of capital declines between  0.5 
and 1.7 percent.  (The exact number depends  on other  assumptions  made in the analysis,  as 
is discussed further  in the appendix.)  These changes are quite small; they correspond  to 
what we might expect as a result of a decline in interest  rates of roughly 25 basis points,  on 
average.  While the direction  of the effect on investment  is clear through  this channel,  it may 
be of little practical  importance.  We will evaluate  the quantitative  impact of this change 
more extensively  in section IV of the Brief 
Other complicating  factors  would  likely reduce  these effects even further.  The 
discussion above applies to the initial situation  immediately  following  a cut in capital gains 
tax rates.  Moving  a step further,  however,  suppose that  firms do undertake  more projects 
as they perceive that they need not provide  their investors  with such a high rate of return. 
The demand for funds will rise throughout  the economy  and drive interest rates up, 
offsetting  the benefit  of lower  capital gains rates for investment.  Indeed, if aggregate  saving 
is not very sensitive to interest  rates,  as some empirical  studies find (see Hall,  1988 and 
19 Skinner and Feenberg,  1990, for example), the offset may be nearly complete.20  In 
addition,  there will likely be some re-allocation  of investment.  The improved  after-tax 
return on investments  that generate  returns in the form of capital gains will tend to attract 
capital away from activities  that are financed with debt or those  that generate  dividends, 
raising the opportunity  cost of funds for firms that use these alternative  financing  methods. 
Some might argue that  such a re-allocation  is good because it favors the typically  more 
risky activities that  may be undertaken  in anticipation  of capital gains income.  But such a 
judgment  is not easy to assess and, in any case, the lost investment  for firms that rely 
relatively  more on debt and dividends than on capital gains must be viewed  as an offset to 
the investment  gains arising from lower capital gains taxes. 
E.  Capital  Gains and Infation 
Under the present  tax law, economy-wide  inflation  raises the effective  real tax rate 
on capital gains income  above the statutory  rate.  This increase occurs  because nominal 
rather than real gains are subject to taxation.  The tax reform proposal  passed by the House 
of Representatives  would  index capital gains for inflation  and tax only real gains.  The result 
would be a reduction  in the capital gains tax rate paid when the economy  experiences 
positive  inflation. 
To illustrate  the effect inflation  has on the effective real capital gains tax rate, 
consider  a capital  asset purchased  for $1000, held for five years,  and then  sold for $1762--a 
nominal gain of $762.  This is consistent  with a 12 percent  annual rate of return.  For a tax 
payer in the 28 percent  bracket,  the tax liability on this gain is $213 ($762 x 0.28).  Suppose 
that through  this period,  the rate of inflation  is 3 percent.  For a $1000 investment  to just 
2o In a Keynesian  context,  when  resources  are not fully  employed,  an increase  of investment  demand  will  stimulate  the 
saving  necessary  to finance  it in equilibrium.  Interest  rates might  still  rise  in this  environment,  however,  due to a rise 
in money  demand  or an increue  in the rate  of interest  charged by financial  intermediaries. 
20 maintain its original purchasing power over this period,  it must increase in value to $1159 
over 5 years.  The difference between the nominal gain and this gain necessary to 
compensate  for inflation,  $603, is the real increase  in the purchasing  power  of the asset. 
When the asset owner pays $213 tax on this gain, the effective tax rate on the real 
(inflation-adjusted)  return is 35 percent  ($213 / $603). 
In this illustration,  indexing capital gains for inflation  amounts  to changing the basis 
of the capital asset from $1000 to $1159. 21 The reported  capital gain then decreases  from 
$762 to $603,  the tax liability from $213 to $169 (.28 x $603), and thus the tax rate on the 
real gain declines from 35 percent to 28 percent. 
Since investors  are concerned  with their real purchasing  power,  it is this effective 
real tax rate on capital gains that determines  the rate of return firms must yield to attract 
capital.  As we describe above, the lower is the tax rate on capital gains income, the lower  is 
the cost of capital for firms that pay owners  with capital gains.  As long as there is a 
positive  rate of inflation,  indexing capital gains for inflation  will decrease the real tax rate on 
capital gains and decrease the cost of capital  for these firms. 
IV.  Capital  Gains  Taxes,  Investment,  and  Growth 
A.  Summary Results 
This section brings together  the discussion  above to evaluate the size of the impact 
of proposed  cuts in the capital gains tax rates  on the U.S. economy.  In what follows,  we 
consider  how the proposed  tax changes under  discussion  in Congress  during the fall of 1995 
will affect the cost of capital and how changes  in the cost of capital translate  into investment 
2 1 The House  bill  prescribes  multiplying  the basis  of the capital  asset by the ratio  of the GDP deflator  for the quarter  in 
which  the asset was sold to the GDP deflator  for the quarter  in which  the asset was purchased. 
21 and  growth.  Briefly,  reducing  the  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  income  and  indexing  capital 
gains  for  inflation  decreases  the  cost  of  capital  to  firms  who  pay  their  owners  at least  in part 
with  capital  gains  income.  We  call the  two  channels  through  which  the  cost  of  capital  falls 
the  “savings”  and  “indexation”  channels.  (See  sections  II1.D  and  II1.E  above  for  further 
discussion.)  At  a lower  cost  of capital,  firms  invest  more,  increasing  the  size  of  the  U.S. 
capital  stock.  A larger  capital  stock  in turn  produces  more  output  (GDP).  We  evaluate  the 
size  of this  increase  in output  by comparing  it to  increases  that  result  from  normal  growth. 
More  specifically,  we  estimate  how  many  days  of normal  growth  the  economy  would  need 
without  the  policy  change  to  produce  the  increase  in output  that  arises  from  the  capital 
gains  tax  cut.  The  results  are  summarized  in Table  1. 
Table  1 
Summary  Effects  of Lowering  the  Statutory  Capital  Gains  Tax  Rate 
and  Indexing  Capital  Gains  for  Inflation 
Saving  Indexation  Combined 
Channel  Channel  Effect 
Percent  Decrease  in the  Cost  of Capital  1.14  1.61  2.25 
Percent  Increase  in the  Capital  Stock  0.57  0.81  1.13 
Percent  Increase  in Output  0.17  0.24  0.34 
Equivalent  Days  of Normal  Growth  25  35  50 
Note:  The saving  channel  estimates  the effect of lowering  the statutory  capital  gains  tax rate from 28 to 19.8 percent. 
Normal  growth  is defined  to be 2.5 percent  per year.  See the appendix  for a detailed  explanation  of these  figures  as 
well  as analysis  of alternative  scenarios. 
22 These  effects  are  quite  small.  They  imply  that  eventually,  after  the  capital  stock  has  fully 
adjusted  to  the  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate,  the  level  of output  will be  only  slightly  higher 
than  it would  have  been  without  the  tax  cut.  The  increase  in output  is what  we  would 
expect  from  normal  trend  growth  in just  a month  or two.  Note  that  this  is an increase  in the 
ZeveZ  of  output.  The  tax  cut  does  not  change  the  long-run  rate  of growth  of the  economy. 
We  shall  now  discuss  these  results  in greater  detail. 
B.  The Cost of CapitaI 
The  capital  gains  tax  cut  proposal  now  under  consideration  in the  U.S.  Congress, 
would  eliminate  the  28  percent  cap  on  the  taxation  of capital  gains  that  was  set  in the  1986 
Act,  but  would  allow  an exclusion  of  50 percent  of capital  gains  income  from  taxes.  Since 
the  highest  marginal  personal  tax  rate  is currently  39.6  percent,  the  maximum  statutory  rate 
on  capital  gains  income  would  become  19.8 percent.  22 How  would  this  change  affect  the 
cost  of  capital  firms  use  to  evaluate  the  profitability  of investment  projects?  One  effect  that 
we  can  quantify  is the  impact  of lower  tax  rates  on the  return  firms  must  provide  to  their 
investors  to  attract  funds.  This  required  return  will be smaller  since  investors  will  pay  lower 
taxes  on  the  capital  gains  that  accrue  to  their  investments. 
The  formula  derived  in the  appendix  allows  us to  estimate  the  size  of this  effect. 
With  the  current  tax  law,  we  estimate  the  cost  of capital  to  be  14.04  percent.  This  figure 
includes  the  tax-adjusted  real  return  that  firms  must  provide  to  compensate  its  investors  for 
the  returns  they  forego  by investing  money  in the  firms’  projects  (4.04  percent)  and  the 
depreciation  rate  on  new  capital  (10  percent).  We  estimate  that  lowering  the  capital  gains 
tax  rate  from  28 to  19.8  percent,  in what  we  call our  “benchmark”  scenario,  would  reduce 
22 As of this writing  (October,  1995) Congress  is considering  imposing  a 21 percent  tax rate  on capital  gains  income 
for individuals  subject  to the alternative  minimum  tax. 
23 this figure to  13.88 percent, a decline of  16 basis points  or only  1.14 percent.  This case is 
the basis for the saving channel figures in table  1. 
The benchmark  uses assumptions  that  reflect the average across different  kinds of 
firms and investors  in the economy.  The actual  change in the cost of capital,  however,  will 
depend on the particular  situation  of firms and investors,  so we also consider  a number of 
alternative  scenarios.  (See the appendix for detailed  calculations.)  Firms with assets that 
depreciate  faster than the assets in a typical  firm would experience an even smaller 
proportionate  decline in the cost of capital because  depreciation  costs are not affected  by 
changes in the capital gains tax rate.  Firms that  do not pay dividends would  enjoy  a larger 
proportionate  decline in the cost of capital.  Since the owners of these firms take  their 
income  entirely in the form of capital gains, they are more sensitive to changes  in the tax 
treatment  of capital gains income.  Shareholder  behavior  is also important  for the magnitude 
of the effects.  The longer shareholders  wait to sell their shares and realize their  capital 
gains, the lower is the effective capital gains tax rate.  Therefore,  the longer this holding 
period,  the smaller is the effect of a given cut in the statutory  capital gains tax rate. 
One must keep in mind that the effects  presented  in the first row of table  1 probably 
overstate  the impact of the saving channel.  These estimates do not account  for the fact that 
if the demand for fimds increases  after the initial decline in cost of capital,  savers will 
require higher returns to firnd additional  new investment.  The tax cut itself could therefore 
lead to changes in capital markets  that increase  interest  rates to some extent,  which is not 
accounted  for in the estimates in table  1. 
In addition,  the impact of the saving channel  may be overstated  as a result  of our 
treatment  of the “effective”  capital gains tax rate (see section II for tirther  discussion  of the 
effective  rate).  There are several ways that  researchers  studying this issue account  for the 
fact that investor  behavior reduces  the effective  tax rate on capital gains income  below the 
statutory  rate.  A common practice  is to halve the statutory  rate to account  for deferral 
benefits  and to halve the resulting  rate again to account  for the step-up  of the cost basis for 
24 a capital gain upon inheritance.  The estimates in table 1 are based on an approach  that  does 
not reduce the effective  capital gains tax rate to this degree (see the appendix).  Table A. 1 
in the appendix shows that the cost of capital declines by only 0.48 percent  with the 
conventional  (double-halving)  method  compared with the  1.14 percent  decline we use for 
the calculations  in table  1. 
The size of the saving channel effects presented in table  1, moreover,  could easily be 
dominated  by changes of interest  rates from other causes.  A 100 basis point  change in real 
interest rates, which is not uncommon  over a period of a couple of years, leads to effects on 
the cost of capital that are more than three times larger than anything  that appears in table  1. 
Even an interest rate change  of just  25 basis points will have an effect on the cost of capital 
that is larger than the effects reported  there.  The capital gains tax cut proposal  under 
consideration  simply does not  do much to effective investment  incentives  in the U.S. 
economy. 
The estimated  effect of the inflation  indexation channel on the cost of capital 
appears in the second column  of table  1 (holding the statutory  capital gains tax rate constant 
at 28 percent).  With anticipated  inflation  at the 3 percent rate that we use for our 
benchmark  calculations,  indexing  capital gains income alone would reduce the cost of 
capital from  14.04 percent  to  13.81 percent,  a 1.61 percent decline.  The decline in the cost 
of capital is modestly  larger than what we obtained for the saving channel.  The pattern  of 
results for firms in varying  situations  and shareholders with different behavior  is similar to 
the alternative  scenarios  discussed  above for the saving channel.  See the appendix for 
further  details. 
The results in the third  column  of table  1 combine the indexation  and saving 
channels.  We estimate that these  policy  changes together  would reduce the cost of capital 
from  14.04 percent  to  13.72 percent,  a decline of 2.25 percent.’ The total  effect is a little 
smaller than the sum of the two  channels  evaluated individually.  This result occurs  because 
the indexation  feature  is less valuable  as the capital gains tax rate declines. 
25 C.  Investment,  Output,  and  Growth  Effects  from  Capital  Gains  Tax  Cuts 
What effect will the modest reductions  in the cost of capital  discussed  in the 
previous  subsection have on the U.S. economy?  How much more investment  will result? 
What will be the effect on output,  growth,  and living standards?  We address these 
questions  in this subsection  with a widely used economic  tool,  the neoclassical  growth 
model.23  According  to this model, the long-term  rate of growth  of output  is determined  by 
the rate  of labor force growth  plus the rate of technical progress.  Changes  in the cost of 
capital,  and therefore  the capital gains tax rate, will not affect either  of these rates. 
Therefore,  the model predicts that a capital gains tax cut will not change  the long-term  rate 
of growth.z4  A lower cost of capital, however,  can increase the demand  for capital and 
raise investment.  This effect increases the productive  capacity  of the economy  and causes 
the level of output to rise.  During the transition  period to the new higher level of output, 
economic  growth will be temporarily  higher. 
To estimate the size of this effect, we must first consider  how much additional 
investment  will result from the change in the cost of capital presented  in the first row of 
table  1.  In spite of the importance  of this issue for a variety  of important  policy questions, 
economic  research has not been able to reach agreement  about  the sensitivity  of investment 
to the cost  of capital.  We shall assume, however,  that a one percent  drop in the cost of 
capital leads to a one-half  percent  increase  in the long-term  level of the capital  stock.  An 
23 This  model  was pioneered  by Solow (1956)  and  is ofkn  called  the Solow growth  model.  This  discussion  focuses 
only on “supply-side”  effects.  To the extent  that Keynesian  demand  insuffkiency  prevents  actual  results  from reaching 
fidl employment  output,  the effects discussed  here  will  overstate  actual  results. 
24 Some recent  theoretical  models  of “endogenous”  economic  growth allow  for the possibility  that changes  in capital 
investment  will  affect the rate of technical  change.  The empirical  relevance  of these  models  has yet to be determined 
We discuss  some of the possible  implications  of endogenous  growth in the next  section. 
26 effect of this magnitude  is relatively large relative to findings from existing research.25  We 
also need to know how much extra output  can be produced  from a given rise in the capital 
stock.  There is wide agreement in research  on economic  growth  that a one percent  increase 
in the capital stock raises output by about 0.3 percent.z6 
These estimates  provide the information  necessary  to evaluate the amount  of growth 
that can be expected  from the capital gains tax cut proposals.  Consider first the effect of 
the capital gains tax cut through  the saving channel (the first column of table  1).  With our 
benchmark  assumptions,  the reduction  in the maximum capital gains tax rate lowers the cost 
of capital by 1.14 percent.  This reduction  raises investment  enough to increase the capital 
stock by 0.57 percent  (0.5 x 1.14).  A 0.57 percent  rise in the capital stock can be expected 
to raise the economy’s potential  output  by 0.17 percent  (0.3 x 0.57).  For an economy  that 
has a trend rate of output  growth  of about 2.5 percent  per year, this change represents  a 
long-term  increase in the level of output  equal to the growth  the economy  would experience 
in about  25 days!  Ifwe  add the inflation  indexation  provision,  we would get almost 50 days 
of growth  (as shown in the third column of table  1).  These changes are very small.  They 
imply that after all the adjustments  take place to the lower  capital gains tax rates (which 
could take  as long as a decade or more),  output  and living standards  might reach a level in 
early January that they would  have attained  some time in late February without  the capital 
gains tax cut and inflation  indexation.  This magnitude  pales by comparison  to the output 
losses the U.S. economy  has experienced  due to recessions  and slow growth,  even during 
the relatively  good  economic  performance  of the postwar  period.  Additional  effects that we 
have not quantified  (the effects due to uncertainty  or the “lock-in“  effect, for example) 
25 In an extensive  survey of investment research, Chirinko (1993)  concludes that the cost of capital has a ‘knodest” 
effixt  on investment and the demand for capital.  In an earlier Levy Institute Policy Brief, Fazzari (1993)  fmds little 
effect of the cost of capital on investment. 
26 See Mdiw,  Romer, and Weil(1992)  for estimates in this range in a recent cross-country study of economic 
growth.  This research also finds that the neoclassical  growth tiework  used here does a good job of explaining  cross- 
country  growth  results. 
27 might increase the impact  of the capital gains tax cut to some extent, but the discussion  in 
section III suggests that these effects are likely to be small, even negligible.  Furthermore, 
the analysis summarized  in table  1 does not account for some effects that  could reduce the 
impact of the capital gains tax cut even further,  such as the increase in interest  rates that 
might arise from higher investment  demand. 
V.  Policy  Implications 
The view that lower  capital gains taxes will somehow  stimulate  much investment 
and growth  has little support.  The effects estimated here show that the likely benefits for 
the aggregate  U.S. economy  from this controversial  tax cut are almost negligible.  The 
distributional  implications  of a capital gains tax cut are also troubling  in the absence of 
much effect on aggregate  living standards.  The benefits of a capital gains tax cut will 
accrue disproportionately  to the wealthy,  and there is little evidence that the economy  will 
experience  much of a gain in output,  employment,  or living standards  that  might justify  such 
a regressive tax policy. 
We have a somewhat  different  view on the proposal  to index capital gains income 
for inflation.  Our analysis shows that we should not expect any substantial  increase  in 
investment  or economic  growth  as the result of capital gains indexation.  Yet, it seems 
arbitrary that the level of effective  capital gains taxation  varies with inflation  rates.z7 
Indexing  capital gains to inflation  for tax purposes,  however,  does not justify  cuts in the 
alrqady low capital gains tax rate.  At current  inflation rates, implementation  of capital gains 
indexing, as it is now proposed,  would  reduce the capital gains tax rate.  It may be better  to 
27 Furthermore,  while  the impact  of indexing  is minimal  in the cumnt  inflation  environment,  our results  show that the 
effect is more substantial  as inflation  approaches  doubledigit  rates.  See the discussion  in the appendix. 
28 consider  indexing  capital  gains  for  inflation,  but  increasing  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  to 
roughly  maintain  current  effective  levels  of capital  gains  taxation. 
One important  assumption  that  drives  these  results  is that  a cut  in the  capital  gains 
tax  rate  does  not  affect  the  rate  of technical  progress.  This  assumption  that  technical 
change  is exogenous,  while  a standard  part  of neoclassical  growth  theory,  has  been 
questioned  in recent  research  on  “endogenous”  sources  of  economic  growth.28  Yet,  even  if 
the  growth  process  is more  complex  than  the  standard  neoclassical  model  implies,  cutting 
the  capital  gains  tax  rate  seems  like  an inefficient  way  to  stimulate  technical  change.  A 
capital  gains  tax  cut  policy  is completely  unfocused;  it benefits  old  as well  as new  capital, 
stagnant  as well  as growing  industries,  and  assets  such  as real  estate  that  have  little  to  do 
with  technical  progress.  29  Poterba  (1989,  p. 48)  writes  that  “less  than  one  third  of  reported 
[capital]  gains  are the  result  of the  appreciation  of corporate  equity.”  Feenberg  and 
Summers  (1990,  p.3-4)  argue  that  “only  a small  fraction  of the  benefits  [from  capital  gains 
tax  cuts]  go  to  venture  capital  or  small  businesses”  and  “between  75 and  80 percent  of the 
first  five  years’  tax  relief  will be a windfall  to  assets  that  are  already  in place.”  Finally, 
Minarik  (1992,  p. 22)  states  that  “a capital  gains  tax  cut  would  divert  resources  into  low- 
value  commercial  real  estate  just  as the  1986  tax  reform  brought  those  resources  back  into 
equipment.”  Policy  makers  are  more  likely  to  be  successful  at boosting  technical  change 
through  policies  like  research  and  development  tax  credits.  Even  the  much-maligned 
investment  tax  credit  focuses  more  sharply  on  the  progressive  sectors  of the  economy  than 
capital  gains  tax  cuts.30 
28  See  the  symposium  on “New Growth Theory”  in the Winter  1994 J~umal  of Economic  Perspectives. 
2g While  it may be possible  to focus capital  gains  tax cuts on the returns  from particular  activities,  this  does not seem 
to be the intention  of current  proposals.  Moreover,  differentiating  the capita1 gains  tax treatment  across  assets  could 
create incentives  to create unproductive  tax shelters. 
3o The investment  tax credit  as implemented  in the past, however,  sutfers  from similar  problems  to the capital  gains 
tax cut:  it benefits  many  activities  that would  have been  undertaken  in the absence  of the credit.  An  investment  tax 
credit  policy  may be more effective  per dollar  of federal  revenue  lost if it can be designed  to apply  to net  or incremental 
investment  only.  See Meyer,  Prakken,  and Varvares  (1993)  for further  discussion. 
29 The  channels  through  which  a change  in the  rate  of taxation  of capital  gains  income 
might  influence  investment  activity  and  economic  growth  are  complex;  at least  more 
complex  than  one  who  follows  the  mainstream  debate  on  this  issue  might  think.  Sound, 
measured  policy  can  be  set  only  with  an understanding  of the  nature  and  efficacy  of these 
channels.  The  considerations  explored  in this  paper  do  not  offer  much  encouragement  for 
the  view  that  lower  capital  gains  tax  rates  will  have  substantial  beneficial  effects  on 
investment  or growth.  This  conclusion  does  not  settle  the  issue  of what  the  capital  gains 
rate  should  be.  Other  issues  that  we  do  not  consider  in detail  here,  primarily  distributional 
in nature,  enter  into  such  a decision.  Yet,  as Joseph  Minarik  (1992,  p.  16) writes, 
The  real  issue  is whether  taxing  some  people  at a different  rate  than  others 
having  the  same  income  level  is appropriate.  Under  the  principles  of 
comprehensive  income  taxation,  a burden  of  proof  rests  with  anyone  who 
argues  that  one  taxpayer  should  be  charged  a lower  rate  than  everyone  else 
at his income  level.  Thus,  those  who  advocate  an exclusion  for  capital  gains 
incur  this  burden  of proof 
Our  findings  call into  question  one  of the  major  arguments  that  is invoked  to  provide  this 
“burden  of proof’  to  support  of  lower  capital  gains  tax  rates  and  our  analysis  therefore 
weakens  the  case  for  capital  gains  tax  cuts. 
30 Appendix:  The  Cost  of Capital 
Indexing  capital gains for inflation  and reducing the capital gains tax rate is thought 
to increase aggregate  investment  because  it lowers the cost of capital to firms that  pay their 
owners in part with capital gains.  In this appendix, we bring together  the elements  of the 
after-tax  cost of new capital investment. 
The cost of capital is “the price paid for the use of capital resources  over a defined 
period  of time” (Auerbach  1983 p. 905).  The real annual after-tax  cost of capital  consists 
of annual maintenance  and depreciation  costs, as well as opportunity  costs.  If the after-tax 
purchase price of an asset is P*,  and the asset depreciates  at a rate 6, then the annual cost of 
maintenance  is SP*.  Even ifan  asset does not depreciate  and requires no maintenance, 
there is still an opportunity  cost associated  with purchasing an asset rather than putting 
funds into interest-bearing  assets. The higher the interest rate, the higher is the opportunity 
cost of capital.  Suppose one dollar returns r dollars of interest in real terms.  The real 
opportunity  cost of a unit of capital with an after-tax price of P* then is given by rP*.  The 
total  after-tax  cost of a unit of capital is then (r + s) P*. 
The after-tax  purchase  price of an asset is the price paid for the asset, PC, less tax 
benefits derived from the investment  tax credit and the capital consumption  allowance.  If 
one dollar spent on a capital asset generates  an investment tax credit of k dollars  and a flow 
of depreciation  allowances  (when discounted  to present value) of z dollars, then the after- 
tax purchase price of an asset is given by PC (I-  k - zz), where  7 is the statutory  tax rate on 
corporate  income. 
Let c be the nominal opportunity  cost of a one dollar capital investment  and ‘II  be the 
expected  rate of inflation.  Then r can be replaced by c - z.  The total  after-tax  cost  of a unit 
of capital is 
Pc(I-k-  zz)(c-lr+  s). 
For each dollar  spent on new capital  equipment,  (c - z + s) dollars  are spent on 
maintenance  and opportunity  costs.  The term (I-  k - a)  adjusts this cost for the investment 
tax credit and the capital consumption  allowance.  The capital gains tax and indexation 
influences only the opportunity  cost of capital, c.  Percentage  changes in the total  after-tax 
31 cost of capital  due to changes in the  capital  gains  tax  rate  and  indexation,  then,  equal 
percentages  changes in (c - z + s).  For  this  reason,  we  restrict  attention  in Tables A. 1 
through  A.3, below, to quantity. 
The Opportunity  Cost  of Capital 
Suppose  the nominal interest  rate is i and a firm finances a new investment  project 
entirely by issuing debt at this rate.  Before  corporate  taxes, each dollar of capital  spending 
generates  i dollars of interest expenses.  Since interest  expenses, however,  are deductible 
from corporate  income, the after-tax  annual cost of one dollar of debt-financed  investment 
is (I-  z) i , where  ris  the tax rate on corporate  income.  This value can also be considered 
the opportunity  cost of spending one dollar  on new capital rather than investing  instead  in 
bonds that  return  i before corporate  taxes. 
Suppose  a firm finances a new investment  project  with equity, which involves 
spending the proceeds  from either new share issues or retained  earnings.  Since new share 
issues actually  finance only a small proportion  of new capital spending (approximately  4.9 
percent),  we ignore them and focus entirely  on retained  earnings.3 1  There is no explicit 
cost of using retained earnings to finance  capital  spending, but we show below that  this cost 
can be expressed  as a function  of observed  variables.  We refer to the opportunity  cost  of 
using one dollar of retained earnings to finance  new investment  as ieq.  Since this cost  is not 
deductible  from corporate  income, the before  and after-tax  corporate  costs are the same. 
The typical firm finances its new capital  spending with a mix of both  debt and 
equity.  The nominal opportunity  cost of capital  faced by the typical  firm can be expressed 
as a weighted  average of the costs attributable  to both  of these sources.  Let the fraction  of 
new investment  financed with debt be L.  Then the opportunity  cost of capital is 
(es.  1)  c=(l-L).i,,  +L.(l-7)-i. 
3 1 See Henderson. 
32 We  next  consider  the  personal  tax  treatment  of  capital  income  and  its influence  on 
the  opportunity  cost  of capital. 
There  are two  ways  to  own  capital,  one  as an equity  holder  (a stock  holder)  and  the 
other  as a debt  holder.  If,  say,  stock  holders  earn  an after-tax  rate  of return  in excess  of 
that  earned  by debt  holders,  the  latter  will  sell debt  and  buy  stock.  32  The  price  of equity 
rises,  the  price  of debt  falls,  and  their  rates  of return  converge.  We  expect  the  reverse  to  be 
true  if debt  returns  more  than  equity.  In  equilibrium,  we  expect  that  the  after-tax  rates  of 
return  to  debt  and  equity  will be  equal. 
Since  interest  payments  are treated  as ordinary  personal  income,  the  after-tax  rate  of 
return  to  debt  is  i(1 -  rP),  where  zP is the  marginal  tax  rate  on  personal  income.  The  after- 
tax  rate  of return  to  equity,  i.e.,  investment  financed  with  retained  earnings,  is not  as simple 
because  the  returns  from  equity  investment  can  be paid  out  as dividends  or  as capital  gains. 
For  purposes  of personal  taxation,  dividends  and  capital  gains  are treated  differently.  The 
return  to  equity  is a weighted  average  of  the  returns  from  dividend  payments  and  from 
capital  gains.  We  assume  that  the  weights  are the  shares  of corporate  income  (net  of 
interest  expenses)  paid  out  as dividends,  d, and  plowed  back  as retained  earnings,  (1 -d) 
Since  dividends  are  treated  as ordinary  income,  the  after-tax  rate  of return  from 
dividend  payments  is  ieq  - (1 -  r,)  .  The  after-tax  rate  of return  from  capital  gains  is 
ieq  - (ieq  - K *  Y> - rcg  , where  rCg is the  effective  marginal  personal  tax  rate  on  capital  gains 
income,  iris  the  rate  of inflation,  and  y is unity  if capital  gains  are  indexed  for  inflation,  zero 
otherwise.  Note  that  when  capital  gains  are  indexed  for  inflation,  real  returns  are taxed  and 
when  capital  gains  are not  indexed  for  inflation,  nominal  returns  are taxed.  The  weighted 
sum  of these  two  terms,  and  hence  the  after-tax  rate  of return  to  equity,  simplifies  to 
ieq.(1-7)+(1-d).rq.n.y,where  ?=d.rP+(l-d).rQ. 
Equating  the  after-tax  returns  to  equity  and  debt  and  solving  for  i,, gives 
32 We are ignoring  issues  of risk.  Normally,  we expect  that equity  holders  will require  some risk premium  that will 
keep  rates on equity higher  than  rates  on debt.  This  issue  will  not significantly  affect the analysis. 
33 ieq  = 
i-(I-7,)-(1-d)-7;Ir*y 
1-Z 
Given that savers can hold wealth as debt or equity, this expression  defines the internal  rate 
of return that equity financed investment  must earn to remain competitive  with  debt. 
Substituting  this expression  into eq. 1 gives the nominal opportunity  cost  of capital 
faced by the typical firm: 
63 2)  c=(l-L). 
[ 
i.(1-7,)-(1-6).7,.Ir.y 
1-Y  1 
+L.(l-  7)-i. 
Parameter  Values 
Compustat  data were used to estimate d and L.  Compustat  tracks  firm-level  data 
for publicly traded  organizations  and covers roughly half of the United  States  non- 
residential  capital stock.  For the years  1973 through  1992, the following  data were 
summed across the sample:  current  debt (CD), long-term  debt (LTD),  total  assets (X4), 
common  dividends (CDW),  preferred  dividends (PD), and after-tax,  before-extraordinary 
income (I).  For each year,  L* = 
CD + LTD  and d*  CDIV + PD  =  were calculated.  The 
TA  I 
values ofL*  and d* were then averaged  across years to obtain  L = 0.3 and  d = 0.5 .  Our 
benchmark  firm, therefore,  finances  30 percent  of its investment  with debt and the 
remainder with retained  earnings.  Half of the return to the benchmark  firm’s owners  is 
dividends,  and half accrues  as capital gains. 
In our benchmark  case, we assume a real opportunity  cost of placing  money  in a 
firm’s assets of 6 percent.  Owners are assumed to realize capital gains after  10 years. 
Zeenberg and Summers (1990) write that “[mlost  capital gains are realized  on assets that 
were held for  10 or more years,”  Nominal  asset values subject to capital  gains taxes  are 
assumed to grow at  10 percent  per year. 
34 Empirical  Calcdations 
With the cost of capital formula and the parameter  value assumptions  discussed 
above we can estimate the impact of changes in the capital gains tax rate on the cost of 
capital. 
Table  A.1 
Change  in  the  Cost  of Capital  From  Lowering  the  Statutory 
Capital  Gains  Tax  Rate  From  28  to  19.8  Percent 
Case 
Benchmark 
High Depreciation  Assets 
Zero Dividend  Firms 
Short Holding  Period 
Low Effective  C.G. Bate 
Cost  of Capital  Cost  of Capital  Percentage 
28 Percent  Rate  19.8  Percent  Rate  Change 
14.04  13.88  -1.14% 
24.04  23.88  -0.67% 
13.29  13.06  -1.74% 
14.24  14.01  -1.61% 
13.74  13.67  -0.48% 
Table A. 1 presents the effective,  after-tax  cost of capital  for firms in various 
circumstances  under both a 28 percent  and a 19.8 percent  statutory  capital gains tax rate. 
With the current tax law, we estimate the effective cost of capital,  using the benchmark 
assumptions,  to be 14.04 percent.  Lowering  the capital gains tax rate from 28 to  19.8 
percent would  reduce this figure to  13.88 percent through  the saving channel,  a decline of 
16 basis points  or only a little over one percent.  How  does this result change if we consider 
firms in different  situations?  Table A. 1 shows that the change  is even smaller in percentage 
terms (under one percent)  for high depreciation  assets, which  is likely relevant  for high 
technology  items like computers.  (The high depreciation  case reported  in table A. 1 assumes 
35 a 20 percent,  rather than  a 10 percent,  depreciation  rate.)  This result occurs because  a 
bigger part of the cost of capital arises from depreciation  in this case.  The lower  cost of 
funds that the firms enjoy due to lower capital gains taxes therefore  has a smaller 
proportionate  effect. 
The percentage  decline in the cost of capital is larger than the benchmark  for zero- 
dividend firms.  The owners  of these firms take their returns  entirely in the form of capital 
gains, and hence such firms are more sensitive to the tax treatment  of capital gains.  The 
effect of the tax cut is also somewhat  larger if asset owners hold their assets for a shorter 
period  of time before  realizing  capital gains.  A short holding  period reduces  the benefits  of 
deferral and therefore  increases  the effective capital gains tax rate.  As a result,  a given  cut 
in statutory  rates has a larger  effect on people who hold assets for a relatively  short period. 
(The short holding period  entry in table A. 1 assumes a 5-year rather than a lo-year 
horizon.)  However,  if we take the approach  to computing  the effective  capital gains tax 
rate followed  in much of the relevant  research and cut the statutory  rate by 50 percent  for 
the deferral benefit and again by 50 percent  for the elimination  of capital gains for 
inheritance,  the percentage  fall in the cost of capital is cut by a factor  of more than two, 
relative to the benchmark  case (as reported  in the low effective  capital gains rate entry  in 
table A. 1).33 
Some analysts would  argue that the 6 percent  real return  assumed in the benchmark 
case is high.  Although  the stock  market  has managed to generate  such returns  historically, 
real interest  rates on low-risk  assets are typically much lower.  If we use a rea! rate of return 
of 3 percent.  the benefits  of a capital gains tax cut are reduced. 
The experiments  reported  in table A. 1 are based on the simplifying assumption  that 
firms do not change their  financial  policies (dividend pay out and debt leverage)  in response 
to a change in capital gains tax rates.  Yet, we would  expect that firms might adjust these 
33 This approach was derived originally  by Bailey  (1969).  Also see King and Fullerton (19&t). 
36 policies  as the  relative  tax  rates  on  different  kinds  of corporate  source  income  change.M 
Lower  capital  gains  taxes  would  likely  encourage  firms  to  retain  more  of their  earnings  and 
finance  a lower  share  of their  investment  with  debt.  The  effects  of these  two  factors  on  the 
cost  of capital  tend  to  offset  each  other.  Lower  dividend  pay  out  reduces  the  cost  of  capital 
as firms  substitute  a lower  tax  form  of income  payment  (capital  gains)  for  a more  highly 
taxed  form  (dividends).  Lower  leverage  increases  the  cost  of capital,  for  our  parameter 
values,  because  the  deductibility  of interest  for  corporate  tax  payments  reduces  the  cost  of 
debt  below  the  cost  of equity  finance.  Even  if these  two  factors  do  not  exactly  offset,  it is 
unlikely  that  the  changes  in financial  policy  would  be  large  enough  to  have  an important 
impact  on  the  results  presented  in table  A. 1. 
Table  A.2 
Change  in the  Cost  of Capital  From  Indexing 
Capital  Gains  Taxes  for  Inflation 
Case 
Benchmark 
High  Depreciation  Assets 
Zero  Dividend  Firms 
Short  Holding  Period 
,Low  Effective  C.G.  Bate 
Cost  of Capital  Cost  of Capital  Percentage 
No Indexation  With  Indexation  Change 
14.04  13.81  -1.61% 
24.04  23.81  -0.94% 
13.29  12.90  -2.92% 
14.24  13.92  -2.21% 
13.74  13.65  -0.70% 
34 See Auerbach (1983)  for a discussion  of effects of this kind. 
37 Table A.2 reports  the effects of holding the statutory  capital gains tax rate at 28 
percent  and simply indexing capital gains income for inflation.  The indexation  effect is 
slightly larger than the effect of cutting  the statutory  rate in the benchmark  case, and the 
patterns  across different  firm situations  and shareholder behaviors  are similar. 
We have also analyzed  a high expected inflation scenario  for which we increased  the 
expected  inflation  rate from 3 to  10 percent.  In this situation,  not surprisingly,  the 
indexation  proposal  is especially valuable,  lowering the effective  cost of capital by 6.02 
percent.  This situation,  however,  does not represent the current  circumstances  of the U.S. 
economy,  and, with a central bank that  seems determined to avoid any acceleration  of 
inflation,  it is not likely that this scenario will be relevant in the foreseeable  future. 
Table  A.3 
Change  in  the  Cost  of Capital  From  Indexation  and  Saving  Channels  Combined 
Case 
Benchmark 
High Depreciation  Assets 
Zero Dividend  Firms 
Short Holding  Period 
Low Effective  C.G. Bate 
Cost  of Capital  Cost  of Capital  Percentage 
Current  Law  Proposed  New  Law  Change 
14.04  13.72  -2.25% 
24.04  23.72  -1.31% 
13.29  12.80  -3.69% 
14.24  13.79  -3.10% 
13.74  13.61  -0.96% 
Table A.3 reports  the predicted  effects of simultaneously  reducing the  statutory  rate 
on capital gains income  and indexing  capital gains income for inflation.  The total  effect is a 
little smaller than the sum of the two  channels evaluated  individually.  This result  occurs 
because the indexation  feature  is less valuable  as the capital gains tax rate declines. 
The figures in tables A. 1 through  A.3 are the basis for the estimates  that  appear  in 
the summary table  1 in the main text. 
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